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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
It is submitted that the view of the dissenters might also have
been permissible without transcending the limits of statutory inter-
pretation2" and that the possibility of dissatisfaction and confusion
in the industry such as existed in the insurance field between the
time of deciding the Southeastern Underwriters' case 2' and the
passage of the McCarran Act22 might thus be avoided.2" Such a
possibility, of course, is very real where a body of comprehensive
state regulation dating from Munn v. Illinois,24 decided some seventy
years earlier, is stricken down in favor of a toothless federal act,
having as its chief sanction the revocation of a federal license ob-
tained on a voluntary basis and which act is administered by an
understaffed, overworked Secretary of Agriculture, whose organiza-
tional setup is woefully inadequate to cope with the duties imposed
on it by the Court's ruling.
ROBERT L. ROLAND, III
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOoLs-A
New Jersey statute authorized a township board of education, to re-
imburse parents of public and Catholic parochial school children
money expended for transportation on public buses. Plaintiff, a local
taxpayer, challenged the statute as being in violation of the First1
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,2 by
20. Ibid. In this case, which involved the question of whose authority, that
of the state or the commission, was superior in the regulation of the utility's
method of accounting, two members of the circuit court of appeals found a
conflict sufficient to invoke the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. The other
member of the court, reasoning in a manner analogous to that advocated in this
writing, concluded that there was no conflict justifying the application of the
act. The case is now pending in the United States Supreme Court.
21. United States v. Southeastern Underwriters' Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533, 64 S.
Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944).
22. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U. S. C. A. § 1011 (1945).
28. For an interesting commentary on this situation see Comment (1946)
30 Marquette L. Rev. 77-97.
24. 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1876).
1. The First Amendment is now applicable to the states by transmission
through the Fourteenth: Schneider v. State, 808 U. S. 147, 60 S. Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed.
155 (1989); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 819 U. S. 105, 63 S. Ct. 870, 87 L. Ed.
1292, 146 A. L. R. 81 (1942); Prince v. Massachusetts, 821 U. S. 158, 64 S.
Ct. 488, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1943); Thomas v. Collins, 823 U. S. 516, 530, 65 S. Ct.
315, 822, 89 L. Ed. 480 (1944); West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 819 U. S. 624, 689, 68 S. Ct. 1178, 1186, 87 L. Ed. 1628, 1638, 147
A. L. R. 674, 682 (1948).
2. The problem of state support of religious schools and the teaching of
religion in public schools has received considerable attention in recent years. See
cases collected In 14 L. R. A. 418 (1892), 5 A. L. R. 879 (1920), 141 A. L. R.
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its contravention of the proscription against support of a church by
the state' and by its denial of due process in the taking of private
property by taxation for a non-public purpose.' The Supreme Court
in a five to four decision held the New Jersey statute constitutional
against both objections. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing
Township, 67 S. Ct. 504,91 L. Ed. 472 (U. S. 1947).
The whole court appeared to be in agreement on the general
principles applicable. The due process challenge was resolved on the
ground that the statute was within the wide discretion that a state
legislature is deemed to have in declaring what it considers a public
purpose-the promotion of education in this case being in the gen-
eral interest of the state.
With respect to the First Amendment the whole court accepted
the proposition of the separation of church and state as the very foun-
dation of religious freedom. As formulated in the majority opinion,
"Neither [the federal government nor the states] can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another."6
The court diverged sharply, however, in applying this rule to
contributions from tax funds to defray the cost of bus fares of chil-
dren attending parochial schools. The factor ignored by the ma-
jority, according to the dissenting justices, was the relationship of the
parochial schools to the church in the light of the provisions con-
tained in the Canons with respect to the education of children.7
It is undoubtedly a fundamental tenet of our society that edu-
1148 (1942). See also Johnson, The Legal Status of Church-State Relationship
in the United States (1934); Thayer, Religion in Public Education (1947); Note
(1941) 50 Yale L. J. 917.
3. The First Amendment commands that a state "shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; . . .
4. Although even the majority opinion virtually admitted that as the statute
now stands it violates the "equal protection" clause as it provided for payment
of Catholic and public school children's transportation only, excluding all other
private or sectarian schools, the court refused to consider the violation as it was
not alleged.
The four dissenting justices would have stricken the statute down on this
ground alone, but preferred to base their principal objection on the issue of the
separation of church and state.
5. Green v. Frazier, 258 U. S. 233, 240, 40 S. Ct. 499, 501, 64 L. Ed. 878
(1920).
6. 67 S. Ct. 504, 511, 91 L. Ed. 472, 480 (U. S. 1947).
7. Under the ruburic "Catholic Schools," the Canon Law of the Church by
which all Catholics are bound, provides: "1215. Catholic children are to be
educated in schools where not only nothing contrary to Catholic faith and morals
is taught, but rather in schools where religious and moral training occupy the
first place. . . . (Canon 1872.)"
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cation is a public function and hence a primary responsibility of the
community. Nonetheless, in the case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters'
it was held that a state could not preclude parochial schools meeting
specified educational requirements from discharging that function.
A natural corollary urged is that in carrying out that educational
function the parochial schools are entitled to reimbursement in full.
The majority opinion, while giving some comfort in this respect, is
carefully phrased to avoid such an extreme.
The decision concludes that the bus fare tax falls into the same
category as tax money spent to maintain sidewalks, streets and sewers
and to furnish police and fire protection to churches and church
schools as well as to all other property owners.' The minority argues
that a comparison with general appropriations concerning matters of
common right does not support a direct appropriation to pay bus
fare to a parochial school; that the First Amendment "forbids sup-
port, not protection from interference or destruction."
The majority concludes that the child alone is benefitted by the
free bus rides.'0 The dissenters argue.that aid to children to attend a
school is in fact an aid to that school; that transportation, like teach-
ers' salaries, the expense of classrooms, et cetera, is only one factor in
general school expense and indistinguishable in principle."
The conclusion that the transportation serves to protect the chil-
dren's safety by elimination of the dangers to which pedestrians or
hitchhikers are exposed 2 is denied by the dissenters as not supported
by the facts of the case, because here the transportation is furnished
on regular city buses and the children are subjected to the same haz-
ards and delays of the public generally.
8. 268 U. S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 89 A. L. R. 468 (1925).
9. Argument used successfully in Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. (2d) 658,
167 P. (2d) 256 (1946).
10. Argument successfully employed in Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. (2d)
658, 167 P. (2d) 256 (1946); Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 484, 191 S. W. (2d) 930
(1946); Tyrie v. Board of Education of Baltimore County, Maryland Circuit
Court 1937; Board of Education of Baltimore County v. Wheat, 174 Md. 814,
199 Atl. 628 (1938); Adams v. St. Mary's County, 180 Md. 550, 26 A. (2d) 377
(1942); Judd v. Union Free School District No. 2, 164 Misc. 889, 300 N. Y. Supp.
1087 (1987).
11. On this ground state transportation was declared unconstitutional in
State ex rel Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 At]. 835 (1934); Sherrod v.
Jefferson County Board of Ed., 294 Ky. 469, 171 S. W. (2d) 963 (1942); Gurney
v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P. (2d) 1002 (1941); Judd v. Board of Ed., 278
N. Y. 200, 15 N. E. (2d) 576, 118 A. L. R. 789 (1938).
12. Partial basis for decision in Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. (2d) 658,
167 P. (2d) 256 (1946); Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 484, 191 S. W. (2d) 980
(1946).
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The majority of the justices felt that a denial of free transporta-
tion to parochial or other sectarian school children on the sole basis
that they attend a sectarian school would be discrimination against
religion;1" the dissenters point out that there can be no legal dis-
crimination where the public schools are open to everyone and that
the denial of state support of a church cannot be called discrimina-
tion when it is specifically forbidden by the "support" clause of the
First Amendment.
The dissenters emphasize that the "support" clause of the First
Amendment embodies the principle of "absolute" separation of
church and state of which Madison and Jefferson were the leading
proponents. 4 It was their firm conviction that religious freedom
flourishes in a free society only and that a tax compelling a believer
or non-believer to support a religious institution of any kind, whether
one's own or another's, struck at the very basis of the free society.
They argued that the first effect of the slightest breach of the prin-
ciple is to instill religious controversy into public life and that the
long range effect of the most minute state subsidization is eventual
state control, leading to the establishment of the most politically
powerful sect and discrimination against all others. 5 In short, re-
ligious persecution replaces religious liberty. The same First Amend-
ment, however, denies the state the power to prohibit the free exer-
cise of religion. The extent to which the courts have applied the
"free exercise" limitation is demonstrated by the Jehovah's Witness
cases.
16
Is there a moral obligation on the state, its educational function
having been assumed by a volunteer group, to contribute to the fi-
nancial advancement of this group by furnishing its school children
with the same material advantages accorded pupils of public schools?
That there is such an obligation and that it should be discharged is
13. Partial basis for decision in Judd v. Union Free School District No. 2.,
164 Misc. 889, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1037 (1937).
14. The First Amendment intended to embody the same objective and pro-
tection as the "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty"-Reynolds v. United States,
98 U. S. 145, 164, 25 L. Ed. 244, 249 (1878); Watson v. Jones, 80 U. S. 679, 20
L. Ed. 666 (1872); Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 833, 842, 10 S. Ct. 299, 300, 83 L.
Ed. 637 (1889).
Jefferson was author of the Virginia statute and it came as the result of
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance (II Writings of James Madison 183)
against a proposal for the renewal of Virginia's tax levy for the support of the
established church.
15. These principles are paraphrased from Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance (II Writings of James Madison 183).
16. West Va. State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 819 U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178,
87 L. Ed. 1628, 147 A. L. R. 674 (1948).
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supported obliquely by the principle of the free exercise of religion,
since denial of equal financial aid to a religious school carrying out a
public function is in a sense an obstacle to the free exercise of that
religion. However, the obligation, if admitted, cannot be discharged
if it contravenes the proscription against state support of religion.
There are several distinctions that may be drawn in analyzing
apparent state aid to religion. For example, a state law which makes
church property immune from taxation, 7 being a passive aid, might
be deemed not support in law; on the other hand a direct state ap-
propriation for the same amount of money that is thus saved, being
an active aid, would be unconstitutional. The same distinction might
be drawn between fire and police protection and the payment of
bus fare.
A further difference lies between direct and indirect aid. Thus,
state furnished transportation to a church school might be consti-
tutional as only indirect aid to the school, although payment of the
teachers' salaries would be considered as direct and prohibited. The
same yardstick might take the guise of a "material or immaterial"
test, allowing state measures which only slightly aid the school, for-
bidding more substantial help."s
A third demarcation might be made between sectarian and non-
sectarian aid. In that case furnishing of secular textbooks"0 could be
deemed state aid only toward the discharge of the school's public
educational function whereas religious textbooks would cross the
line into the unconstitutional zone.
Thus secular textbooks, an active aid much more direct and
material than free transportation, may more clearly be allowed under
the "support" clause limitation than free transportation, which by its
17. Tax exemption for Catholic schools is available in varying degrees in all
states but California. In California only sectarian colleges are tax exempt. Gabel,
Public Funds for Church and Private Schools (1937) 760-761.
18. The minority expressed great fear of allowance of the slightest state aid
of religion as the first breach of the principle, paving the way for more serious
violations. In the words of Madison, " .. . the same authority which can force
a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any
one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment In all
cases whatsoever." (II Madison, 188, 185-86).
19. This is the first time that the First Amendment issue h as been squarely
presented to the Supreme Court. Free state textbooks for Louisiana parochial
schools were upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in Cochran v.
Louisiana State Board of Ed., 281 U. S. 870, 50 S. Ct. 335, 74 L. Ed. 918 (1980),
but the only issue presented in the briefs was whether the state's action Involved
a public or an exclusively private function under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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nature is not directed solely at the secular phase of the school's gen-
eral program. A possible compromise would be to make transporta-
tion payments to church school children only a percentage of that
granted to public school children in recognition of the school's mixed
character. The question of whether state transportation to a parochial
school constitutes "support" in law involves a question of fact and
might well have gone either way.20 The majority, while affirming
that the Court could not approve the slightest breach of the high and
impregnable wall erected between church and state by the First
Amendment, concluded that New Jersey had not breached it here.
To the minority the decision was an only too vivid reminder of Julia
who, according to Byron's reports, "whispering 'I will ne'er con-
sent'-consented."
Delineation of the boundary line between state aid which con-
stitutes "support" in law and that which does not must await further
decisions involving varying degrees of aid in fact.
JOSEPH H. STEPHENS
INCOME TAXES-MINES AND MINERALS-SEPARATE AND COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY-Oil bonuses and royalties were received from a
lease on the separate property of the husband. The husband and
his wife divided these items equally in their tax returns. No pre-
nuptial agreement existed concerning the income from separate and
community property. Held, an oil and gas lease is a dismemberment
of the realty amounting to a partial alienation, and the bonus, paid
in part consideration therefor, belongs to the separate estate of the
husband. As royalty is a share of the product reserved by the lessor,
it is not a "civil fruit" and hence does not become a community
asset.1  Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Gray, 159 F. (2d) 834
(C. C. A. 5th, 1947).
20. Perhaps the majority were partially motivated by the possibility that a
contrary decision might place the court in an embarrassing position should the
constitutionality of the G. I. Bill of Rights, a popular and beneficial federal law,
be similarly attacked. It is common knowledge that the federal measure is a
substantial aid to many denominational colleges. Payment of tuition, fees, cost
of textbooks and living expenses is clearly a more active, direct and material
aid to a college than free bus fare is to a parochial school. Since higher educa-
tion is not compulsory, the argument that the college is discharging a public
function is not as strong as in the case of parochial schools. Possible distinctions
might be the comparative emphasis on religion in the two types of schools, or
the emergency character of the G. I. Bill of Rights.
1. In two recent cases the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana reached a result contrary to the decision of the present case by
1947]
